The North of Italy, gradually formed into one State, would have, hv course of time as the old petty jealousies died out (a long process, as Napoleon knew), become a State strong enough to aid France, but too weak to be able to stand alone. Scattered as it were round the Continent, the dependent Kings of Sweden, Denmark, Naples, and Spain were to look to France for their protection.

It is important to remember that almost the whole of this was actually accomplished by Napoleon at the time when he threw away all the results of his labors by his mad attack on Spain. Metternich himself acknowledges that the middle of Germany was contented. " The people of those German States whose territory had been enlarged by the peace of Pres-burg (1805) and the peace of Vienna (1809) were contented with these and the protection of the conqueror of the world. . . . In Austria . . . the expression * German feeling' had no more meaning than a myth" *(Metternich,* vol. i. p. 166). See also Metternich's confession of Austria's weakness even in 1813 *(Metternich,* vol. i. p. 177). There remained one thing—the inevitable attack on Russia. If we can imagine this carried out in the way we know Napoleon originally planned, a slow, gradual advance, supported by the new Polish State which was to grow up behind the army, the whole movement unhurried by the pressure in Spain, and his full prestige undimmed by the Spanish troubles, we must feel sure that Russia never could have withstood the shock. The ultimate defeat of Napoleon is no argument against the success of his really great plan: he fell not so much by the efforts of the Allies as from his own errors. He had placed France in a situation where she only required ordinary statesmanship and ordinary military talents to enable her to retain dominion over the Continent. The common error of believing that he aimed at making the whole of Europe in his time an integral part of his Empire hardly needs refutation.

It will be seen that the map presents some inconsistencies with this view of the Empire. But most of these can be explained. Napoleon held the Illyrian provinces, partly for a temporary purpose, to cut off Austria from the sea and so to carry out his Continental system,—chiefly to eventually use them as a bribe to Austria to yield her own Polish provinces and to consent to the revival of Poland. The annexation of the North of Germany was due to the wish to carry out the Continental system, and it is hardly possible that it was intended to be permanent. These lands would have probably been used for exchanges.

The retention by Napoleon of part of the North of Italy is not quite so easy to explain. It was probably partly due to his tendency to display a cmious jealousy and distrust of his own creations. By the retention oi th,ese lands he retained a hold over the new Kingdom of Italy. But, what is more likely to have been his chief motive, he made the task ot that Kingdom easier by lessening the number of the States she had to absorb, He himself, we know, was much impressed with the time required for ^fte growth of a really national feeling in Italy; and the presence of